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Abstract
We introduce a “Statistical Query Sampling” model, in which the goal of an algorithm is to produce
an element in a hidden set S ⊆ {0, 1}n with reasonable probability. The algorithm gains information
about S through oracle calls (statistical queries), where the algorithm submits a query function g(·) and
receives an approximation to Prx∈S [g(x) = 1]. We show how this model is related to NMR quantum
computing, in which only statistical properties of an ensemble of quantum systems can be measured,
and in particular to the question of whether one can translate standard quantum algorithms to the NMR
setting without putting all of their classical post-processing into the quantum system. Using Fourier
analysis techniques developed in the related context of statistical query learning, we prove a number of
lower bounds (both information-theoretic and cryptographic) on the ability of algorithms to produces an
x ∈ S, even when the set S is fairly simple. These lower bounds point out a difficulty in efficiently
applying NMR quantum computing to algorithms such as Shor’s and Simon’s algorithm that involve
significant classical post-processing. We also explicitly relate the notion of statistical query sampling to
that of statistical query learning.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the development of a number of exciting quantum algorithms: Simon’s algo-
rithm for the hidden XOR secret problem [28], Shor’s algorithm for factoring and discrete logarithms [26,
27], Boneh and Lipton’s algorithm for the hidden subgroup problem [4], and many generalizations and
extensions [21, 11, 12, 18, 15, 17]. At the same time, work has been ongoing on various proposals for physi-
cally realizing quantum computers. Currently, one of the most promising such proposals is based on Nuclear
Magnetic Resonance (NMR) [10, 7, 13, 5]. The NMR approach works by manipulating a large ensemble
of quantum systems in solution. One property of the NMR method, which is the focus of this paper, is
that unlike the “standard” quantum computing model, one cannot directly measure any individual quantum
system in the ensemble. Instead, a measurement is limited to a single qubit, and when a measurement takes
place, the device returns (an approximation to) the expected value of this measurement, over the quantum
systems in the ensemble. For this reason, the model for NMR is sometimes called the “expected-value”
(EV) model [6]. In contrast, the measurement in the standard quantum model yields a random sample state
(which may consists of multiple bits) according to a classical probability distribution.
Given the distinction between the standard model and the EV model, the first question that arises is
whether it is possible to translate algorithms working in the standard model to work in the EV model. In
fact, the answer is yes. Consider any BQP algorithm [24]. Recall from the definition that a BQP algorithm
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solves a decision problem, and such an algorithm has a special “target” qubit to indicate acceptance. For
a language L and an input x, if x ∈ L, then the measurement of the target qubit will produce a “1” with
probability at least 3/4; if x 6∈ L, the probability is at most 1/4 when measured. Such an algorithm
works naturally in the EV model, since one can simply measure the target qubit, and even with significant
measurement error, use the rule that if the observed value v ≥ 1/2, then x ∈ L, and otherwise x 6∈ L.
For a search (as opposed to decision) problem, we can perform the usual reduction to a series of decision
problems, solving each one by one. In fact, many researchers have used this approach [13, 24], which we
call an “all-inclusive” translation.
Unfortunately, the “all-inclusive” translation can greatly increase the amount of work that must be done
by the quantum system. Consider Shor’s algorithm, for instance (see Appendix A). Shor’s algorithm (and
others like it) consists of a quantum sampling circuit Q, whose output is measured and fed into a classical
extraction circuit C . For the all-inclusive translation, the classical extraction circuit C needs to be “quan-
tumized”, i.e., realized by a quantum circuit and appended to the quantum sampling circuit Q. This can
cause a significant increase in the size of the quantum circuit — in the case of Shor’s algorithm, the entire
circuitry for computing continued fractions needs to be realized in quantum — which is a rather undesirable
consequence. Even in the most optimistic scenarios, quantum computers will be orders of magnitude more
difficult to manufacture and maintain than classical computers, and thus we would like to put as little of the
complexity as possible in the quantum system. Even more serious problems emerge when more than one
sample is needed by the classical extraction circuit. For example, in Simon’s algorithm, Ω(n) samples are
needed for Gaussian elimination (see Appendix A). Now the all-inclusive translation needs to manufacture
multiple copies of the quantum sampling circuit and then connect them together with the “quantumized”
classical extraction circuit. This can cause even more blowup in the size of the quantum circuit in the EV
model.
In this paper, we consider the question of whether there might be more efficient translations that apply
generally to algorithms consisting of a quantum sampling circuit Q followed by a classical extraction circuit
C , that work without having to put the classical part of the algorithm into the quantum system. Our main
contributions are results that answer this question in the negative, for several natural notions of “general”.
We achieve these results through a connection to the notion of statistical query learning [22] studied in
Computational Learning Theory, and in particular to a related notion that we introduce of statistical query
sampling. Using techniques from Fourier analysis and cryptography, we show that even in cases where the
distribution implied by Q is quite simple, it can be hard to use the EV model to generate a sample that
can be used by C . Note that our results do not preclude the possibility of approaches tailored to specific
quantum algorithms. For example, Collins [6] demonstrates a modification to Grover’s algorithm that is
more efficient than the all-inclusive translation (see also the discussion below). However, as pointed out by
the author, his approach does not generalize to algorithms like Shor’s.
1.1 Our model and results
We view the quantum sampling circuit Q as representing a hidden set S ⊆ {0, 1}n, and we view the classical
post-processing as a circuit C such that C(x) = 1 for all x ∈ S. The goal of the translation procedure is
to produce some x ∈ S. To find such an x, the algorithm has the ability to perform a “statistical query” of
Q by proposing a query function (a predicate) g : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1} and asking for Ex∈S[g(x)] up to some
1/poly accuracy. For example, measuring the ith qubit corresponds to the query g(x) = xi. Taking the
XOR of the first three qubits and then measuring the result corresponds to the query g(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3.
The algorithm may repeat this process multiple (polynomially-many) times, with different query functions
g, and in the end must (with noticeable probability) produce an x ∈ S.
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Note that this task is easy to do if S is very large (|S| ≥ 2n/poly(n)), since a random x ∈ {0, 1}n
will do. It is also easy to do if S is very small (|S| = poly(n)). In particular, if |S| = poly(n), then by
asking for an accuracy of 1/(2|S|) one can distinguish the case that Ex∈S[g(x)] = 0 from the case that
Ex∈S[g(x)] > 0. This allows one to walk down the bits of x, fixing bits from left to right, until a specific
x ∈ S is produced. This is the key idea of [6].
We show, however, that this task is hard in general. Specifically, we give two types of hardness results.
First, we give an information-theoretic hardness result if the query algorithm is not allowed to access C .
That is, the translator is allowed to use the fact that the classical extraction circuit C is polynomial in size
(so the set of accepting strings cannot be totally arbitrary) but it is not allowed to examine C — it can
only gain information via the queries g. Second, we give a cryptographic hardness result if we assume the
translator is given C as input, but that otherwise C is an arbitrary polynomial-size circuit. We still do not
know if efficient translation is possible for the specific circuit C used in Shor’s algorithm.
We also consider a more general setting, in which S may be large (e.g., |S| = 2n−1), so a random
string has reasonable chance of belonging to S, but the goal of the translation is to produce a string x ∈
S with probability substantially greater than random guessing. We call this more general setting “strong
SQ-sampling”, and refer to the former setting as the “weak SQ-sampling”. Strong SQ-sampling models
situations such as Simon’s algorithm, in which the quantum circuit produces a random y ∈ {0, 1}n such
that y · s = 0 for the hidden secret s. In this case, a random string has probability 1/2 of belonging
to S, but we need Ω(n) correct samples in a row in order to perform Gaussian elimination. We give an
information-theoretic hardness result for this problem, that holds for the specific set S used by Simon’s
algorithm (Theorem 2).1
1.2 Techniques and relation to Statistical Query learning
Our results are based on a connection to the Statistical Query (SQ) learning model, first introduced by
Kearns [22] as a restricted version of the popular Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) model of Valiant [30].
In these learning models, the goal of an algorithm is to learn an approximation to a hidden function
f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}. In the PAC model, the algorithm has access to an “example oracle”, which pro-
duces a random labeled sample 〈x, f(x)〉 upon invocation. In the SQ model, however, the algorithm does
not see explicit examples or their labels. Instead, the algorithm queries an “SQ-oracle” with predicates
g(x, y), and receives an approximation to Prx[g(x, f(x)) = 1]. For instance, the algorithm might ask for
the probability that a random example would both be positive and have its first bit set to 1 (g(x, y) = x1∧y).2
The SQ model has proven to be very useful because (a) it is inherently tolerant to classification noise (this is
the reason the model was developed), and (b) nearly all machine learning algorithms can be phrased as SQ
algorithms. What makes the SQ model especially interesting is that one can information-theoretically prove
lower bounds on the ability of SQ algorithms to learn certain classes of functions [22, 3, 20, 31, 32].
The relationship between the standard model and the EV model for quantum computation is quite similar
to that between the PAC model and the SQ model in machine learning, which motivates our definition of
the Statistical Query Sampling problem. In particular, the SQ sampling problem can be viewed as the
SQ learning problem with two key differences: first, the goal is not to learn an approximation to f but is
1Note, for Simon’s algorithm, we no longer want to think of there existing a known classical extraction circuit. If we were given
access to a circuit C such that C(x) = 1 iff x ∈ S (e.g., the circuit with the hidden secret built in) then the sampling goal would be
easy. See Theorem 4 for further discussion.
2In both PAC and SQ learning models, the distribution over x need not be the uniform distribution (or even known to the
learning algorithm). However, much work on SQ learning does focus on the uniform distribution, and that is the setting we are
most interested in in this paper.
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rather to produce a positive example, and second, the oracle for SQ sampling returns approximations to
Pr[g(x) = 1 | f(x) = 1] rather than to Pr[g(x, f(x)) = 1] (a difference that matters when the set of
positive examples is quite small).
We use techniques from Fourier analysis to prove the following lower bounds. First (Theorem 1) we
show there exist simple function classes such that no algorithm, using only a polynomial number of queries
of 1/poly accuracy, can produce a positive instance with even 1/poly probability. Second (Theorem 2), for
the class of “negative parity” functions arising in Simon’s algorithm, no algorithm using only a polynomial
number of queries of 1/poly accuracy, can produce a nontrivial positive instance with probability more than
1/2 + 1/poly. (Note that random guessing works with probability 1/2). We also show that unlike the case
of SQ learning, the SQ sampling problem can be computationally hard even if f is explicitly given to the
algorithm, based on cryptographic assumptions (see Theorem 3).
Finally, we explicitly relate the notion of SQ sampling to that of SQ learning by proving that if a function
class is “dense”, meaning that a random element has non-negligible probability of being positive, then strong
SQ-learnability implies strong SQ-samplability (Theorem 4). We also point out that there exists function
classes that are perfectly SQ-samplable, yet not even weakly SQ-learnable.
2 Preliminaries and Definitions
We are interested in predicates that map elements from a domain X (e.g., {0, 1}n) to {0, 1}. For a predicate
f : X 7→ {0, 1}, an input x is a positive input to f if f(x) = 1, else it is a negative input. All the positive
inputs to f form the positive set of f , denoted by Sf . A predicate class, often denoted by Cn, is simply a
collection of predicates over {0, 1}n. A predicate class family is an infinite sequence of predicate classes
C = (C1, C2, ...), such that Cn is a predicate class over {0, 1}n.
A parity function ⊕s(x) is defined to be ⊕s(x) = s · x mod 2. A negative parity function ¬ ⊕s (x) is
the negation of the parity function ⊕s(x).
2.1 Statistical Query Sampling
Definition 1 (Statistical Query Sampling Oracle) A statistical query sampling oracle (SQS-oracle) for a
predicate f is denoted by SQSf . On input (g, ξ), where g : {0, 1}n 7→ {−1,+1} is the query function and
ξ ∈ [0, 1] is the tolerance, the oracle returns a real number y such that |y −Ex∈Sf [g(x)]| ≤ ξ.
Definition 2 (SQ-Samplability) A predicate class family C is SQ-samplable at rate s in time t and tolerance
ξ, if there exists a randomized oracle machine Z , such that for every n > 0 and every f ∈ Cn, Z with access
to any SQS-oracle SQSf , runs in at most t(n) steps, asks queries with tolerance at least ξ, and outputs an
x ∈ Sf with probability at least s(n). We say C is strong SQ-samplable if for every ǫ, C is SQ-samplable
at rate 1 − ǫ in time t and tolerance ξ such that t and ξ−1 are polynomial in n and 1/ǫ. We say C is weak
SQ-samplable if there exists a polynomial p, such that C is SQ-samplable at rate 1/p(n) in time and inverse
tolerance polynomial in n.
Definition 3 (Sampling Algorithms with Auxiliary Inputs) A predicate class family C is SQ-samplable
with auxiliary input φ if it is SQ-samplable by an algorithm Z which takes φ(f) as the auxiliary input,
where f is the predicate being sampled.
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3 Lower Bounds Based on Fourier Analysis
We first prove two hardness results on SQ sampling, using Fourier analysis techniques developed in the
context of SQ learning.
3.1 A Lower Bound on Weak SQ-Sampling
We prove that there exist very simple families of predicate classes that are not weak SQ-samplable, i.e., no
efficient algorithm can produce a positive input at any non-negligible rate.
We introduce a bit more notation. We use boldface to denote a vector and index the entries of an n-
dimensional vector from 0 to (n − 1). We use x[i] to denote the i-th entry of x. x[a..b] indicates the
sub-vector formed by the entries of x between the a-th and the b-th, inclusive. Let Xˆn,p be the set of all
n-dimensional vectors over Zp (the Galois field modulo p) whose last n− 1 entries are not all-zero, i.e.,
Xˆn,p = {x ∈ Znp | x[1..n − 1] 6= (0, 0, ..., 0)}. (1)
It is easy to see that |Xˆn,p| = pn − p.
Definition 4 (Booleanized Linear Functions) A booleanized linear function over Xˆn,p with parameter a
is denoted by La and defined as
La(x) =
{
1 if a · x = 1 (mod p)
0 otherwise (2)
We say La is normalized if a[0] = 1. The normalized booleanized linear function class, denoted by Ln,p,
consists of all normalized booleanized linear functions over Xˆn,p. In other words,
Ln,p = {La | a ∈ Znp , a[0] = 1} (3)
Theorem 1 If a sampling algorithm for the normalized booleanized linear function class Ln,p makes less
than pn/4 queries, each of tolerance 1/pn/3, then the probability it produces a positive input x ∈ Xˆn,p is at
most 1/p + 1/pn/13.
Notice that the requirement x ∈ Xˆn,p is simply to rule out the trivial positive input 100 . . . 0, and we
could have equivalently just modified the definition of a “booleanized linear function” so that this specific
example is made negative. Also, notice that if we choose p to be much greater than n, say picking p to
be an n-bit prime number, then 1/p + 1/pn/13 is exponentially small, while the size of the problem is still
polynomial in n. Furthermore, if a completely random x is picked, the probability it is a positive input is
1/p. Thus even exponentially many queries may only help the sampling by an exponentially small margin.
Proof: Our proof strategy is similar to that used by Kearns [22] and Blum et. al. [3] in the context of SQ
learning. We describe an “adversarial” SQS-oracle S˜QS that does not commit to any particular predicate
at the beginning. Rather, the oracle maintains a “candidate predicate set” P , which initially includes all
predicates in the class Ln,p (a total pn−1 of them). Each time the algorithm Z makes a query, S˜QS replies
with an answer that yields very little information. Some predicates in the candidate set P might not be
consistent with the answer and will be removed from set P . After all the queries are finished, S˜QS then
commits to a random predicate remaining in P . We shall prove that each query only removes a small
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fraction of the predicates from P . Thus if Z does not make enough number of queries, there would be
enough predicates left in P such that no element can be positive with high probability.
For a query function g : Xˆn,p 7→ {−1,+1}, we say that a subset S ⊆ {0, 1}n is a ξ-independent subset
for g, if |Ex∈S [g(x)]−Ex∈Xˆn,p [g(x)]| ≤ ξ, and we say a predicate f is ξ-independent from g, if its positive
set Sf is a ξ-independent set for g. Intuitively, if a predicate f is ξ-independent from g, then the query
(g, ξ) reveals almost no information about f , since S˜QS can reply with Ex∈Xˆn,p [g(x)] instead, which is
completely independent from f .
We describe the behavior of our SQS-oracle S˜QS in more detail. On query g, S˜QS replies with Ex∈Xˆn,p [g(x)],
and removes all predicates that are not ξ-independent from g from the candidate set P . We assume that all
queries have tolerance ξ = p−n/3. We shall prove that for any query g, there are at most p2n/3+2 predicates
not p−n/3-independent from g. This proof is by a Fourier analysis technique and is given as Lemma 5 in Ap-
pendix D. Thus, if less than pn/4 queries are made, the candidate set still contains at least pn−1(1−p−n/12−3)
parity functions.
Now consider the domain Xˆn,p. It is not hard to see that every x ∈ Xˆn,p is positive for only pn−2
predicates. So, if the oracle commits to a random predicate out of the set of pn−1(1 − p−n/12−3), the
probability that x is positive is at most 1/p + 1/pn/13.
3.2 A Lower Bound on Sampling Negative Parity Predicates
We prove that a class of negative parity functions is not SQ-samplable in polynomial time at any rate non-
negligibly higher than 1/2.
Theorem 2 Let Xn = {0, 1}n\{0n} and Cn be the class of negative parity functions over Xn. If a sampling
algorithm for Cn makes less than 2n/4 queries, each of tolerance 2−n/4, then the probability it produces a
positive input is at most 12 +
1
2n/4−2
.
Before proving the theorem, we point out how this result relates to the translation of Simon’s algorithm
to the NMR model. In Simon’s algorithm, the quantum sampling circuit produces a random y ∈ {0, 1}n
such that y · s = 0, where s is the “hidden” secret (see Appendix A). Thus the hidden set corresponds
exactly to the negative parity function ¬⊕s. In the algorithm, the quantum sampling circuit is invoked Θ(n)
times and produces Θ(n) samples for Gaussian elimination. Notice that y = 0n is useless. Therefore, a
translation of the quantum sampling circuit will produce an SQ-sampling algorithm Z to be executed Θ(n)
times and to produce Θ(n) positive samples in Xn = {0, 1}n\{0n}. However, Theorem 2 implies that it is
not possible to sample efficiently at any rate non-negligibly higher than 1/2 (notice that a random x ∈ Xn
is positive with probability almost 1/2). This result suggests that it appears necessary to manufacture Θ(n)
copies of the quantum sampling circuit and run these copies together in the NMR model.
Proof sketch: The proof strategy is similar to that of Theorem 1. We assume that each query has tolerance
ξ = 1/2n/4. We construct an SQS-oracle that on query function g, replies with Ex∈{0,1}n [g(x)], and
remove all predicates that are not ξ-independent from g from the candidate set P (here the definition of
“ξ-independent” naturally changes to |Ex∈S [g(x)]−Ex∈{0,1}n [g(x)]| ≤ ξ). We shall prove in Lemma 7 (in
Appendix D) that for any query g, there are at most 2n/2+2 predicates not 2−n/4-independent from g. Thus,
if less than 2n/4 queries are made, the candidate set still contains at least 2n − 23n/4+2 − 1 parity functions.
Now consider the domain Xn = {0, 1}n\{0n}. It is not hard to see that every x ∈ Xn is positive for
2n−1 negative parity functions. Now if a random parity function is chosen from a set of size 2n−23n/4+2−1,
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the probability that x is positive is at most
2n−1
2n − 23n/4+2 − 1 ≤
1
2
+
1
2n/4−2
.
This is true for any x ∈ Xn. Therefore, whatever Z outputs, the probability that it is positive is at most
1
2 +
1
2n/4−2
.
4 A Cryptographic Lower Bound
We next prove a cryptographic lower bound. Assuming that one-way functions exist, we show that there
exist predicate class families that are not weak SQ-samplable, even if the sampling algorithm is given the
complete description of the predicate as the auxiliary input. The technique we use here is somewhat similar
to that of Angluin and Kharitonov [1], who used signature schemes to prove that membership queries do not
help to learn DNF.
We briefly describe the ideas behind our proof. We will use a digital signature scheme secure against
adaptive chosen message attack [14], which exists if one-way functions exist [25]. Let the predicate be
the signature verification function vervk(m, s), which returns 1 if s is a valid signature to message m with
respect to the verification key vk. The security of the signature scheme states that no “breaker” B, given
access to a signing oracle, can produce a new valid signature it has not yet seen. We want to argue that this
implies no sampling algorithm Z , given access to a SQ-sampling oracle, can produce any valid signature.
We will show that if such an algorithm Z exists, we can construct a “breaker” B as follows. The breaker
will have access to a signing oracle OSign that signs any message given to it as input, and runs Z as a
subroutine. The only non-trivial part for B is to simulate an SQS-oracle used by Z without revealing to Z
any information about which signatures it has already seen (so that Z is not biased towards producing an
already-seen signature). Upon a query (g, ξ) from Z , B will produce a number of random messages, ask
the signing oracle to sign them, and use these samples to estimate Ex∈Sf [g(x)]. Next, B “randomizes” this
estimate by adding an artificial noise to it. With properly chosen parameters, this “randomized” estimate is
still a valid answer with very high probability, and yet almost independent from the messages B produces.
Finally, Z produces a positive input, which is a message/signature pair (m′, s′). The distribution of the this
pair (m′, s′) is also almost independent from the messages B produces, and if Z only makes polynomially
many queries, then only polynomially many messages will be produced by B. Therefore the probability that
m′ is one of the messages produced by B is very small, and so B breaks the digital signature scheme with
reasonably high probability.
Formally, a signature scheme SIG is a triple (sig gen, sig sign, sig verify) of algorithms, the first two
being probabilistic, and all running in polynomial time. sig gen takes as input 1n and outputs a sign-
ing/verification key pair (sk, vk). sig sign takes a message m and a signing key sk as input and outputs
a signature s for m. WLOG we assume that both m and s are n-bits long. sig verify takes a message m,
a verification key vk, and a candidate signature s′ for m as input and returns the bit b = 1 if s′ is a valid
signature for m for the corresponding verification key vk, and otherwise returns the bit b = 0. Naturally, if
s = sig sign(sk,m), then sig verify(vk,m, s) = 1. In an adaptive chosen message attack [14], an adver-
sary (“breaker”) B is given vk, where (sk, vk)← sig gen(1n), and tries to forge signatures with respect to
vk. The breaker B is allowed to query a signing oracle OSignvk , which signs any message with respect to
vk, on messages of its choice. It succeeds in existential forgery if after this it can output a pair (m, s), where
sig verify(vk,m, s) = 1, but m was not one of the messages signed by the signature oracle. A signature
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scheme SIG is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks if there is no forging algo-
rithm B that runs in time polynomial in n and succeeds with probability 1/poly(n). Such schemes exist if
one-way functions exist [25].
Theorem 3 Let SIG = (sig gen, sig sign, sig verify) be a digital signature scheme secure against adap-
tive chosen message attack. Then the predicate class family Cn = {vervk} is not weakly SQ-samplable,
even if the sampling algorithm is given vk as the auxiliary input. Here vervk is defined to be vervk(m, s) =
sig verify(vk,m, s), where (sk, vk)← sig gen(1n), and m, s ∈ {0, 1}n.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that there exists an algorithm Z that weak SQ-samples the function class
Cn = {vervk}. More precisely, we assume that Z produces a positive input with probability ǫ by making
q queries, where both 1/ǫ and q are bounded by a polynomial in n. We shall construct a polynomial-time
algorithm B that breaks the signature scheme SIG with probability ǫ/2, causing a contradiction.
We now describe the behavior of B. B has access to a signing oracle OSignvk and interacts with the
sampling algorithm Z as the SQS-oracle. When Z makes a query (g, ξ), B does the following. First, B
computes ξ0 = ξ·ǫ10q and M =
2 ln(10q/ǫ)
ξ2
0
. Then B draws M random messages m1,m2, ...,mM ∈ {0, 1}n,
and asks the signing oracle to sign all of them. Assume the signatures are s1, s2, ..., sM . Next, B uses these
message/signature pairs to estimate the expected value of g by computing x = 1M
∑M
k=1 g(mk, sk). Then B
“randomizes” x by drawing a y uniformly randomly from the interval [x− ξ2 , x+ ξ2 ], and sending y to Z as
the answer to the query (g, ξ). B also maintains a “history set” set H of all the messages it has generated,
which is initially ∅. After a query from Z is answered, B adds the messages m1,m2, ...,mM to set H .
After all the q queries are made, Z produces a pair (m′, s′). If vervk(m′, s′) = 1 and m′ 6∈ H , then B
outputs (m′, s′) and successfully forges a signature. Otherwise B aborts and announces failure.
It is clear that B runs in polynomial time. Intuitively, we can show that after the randomization, with
high probability the sample (m′, s′) produced byZ is almost independent from the history set H . Therefore,
with high probability, m′ 6∈ H , and so B will succeed. More precisely, we prove that B will succeed with
probabilit at least ǫ/2.
We use Svk to denote the positive set for predicate vervk. In other words, Svk consists of valid mes-
sage/signature pairs with respect to the verification key vk.
Claim 1 For a query function g, if we define σ = E(m,s)∈Svk [g(m, s)], then with probability at least 1 −
ǫ/5q, we have |x− σ| ≤ ξ0 (all quantities are as defined in the proof sketch of Theorem 3).
Proof: This is due to a straightforward application of the Hoeffding Bound. Each sample (mk, sk) is an
independent random element from Svk and thus E(m,s)∈Svk [g(m, s) = 1] = σ. So the expected value of x
is σ. Now, the probability that M independent samples yields an average below σ − ξ0 is at most e−Mξ20/2
(notice that the range of g is {−1,+1}). Also the probability that the average is above σ + ξ0 is at most
e−Mξ20/2. Therefore with probability at least 1− 2e−Mξ20/2 ≥ 1− ǫ/5q, we have |x− σ| ≤ ξ0.
We fix a set consisting of M message/signature pairs generated by B in response to a query (g, ξ), and
denote this by U : U = {(mk, sk)}Mk=1. We call this set a sample set. We say U is typical, if the average
g(mk, sk) is indeed ξ0-close to σ. By Claim 1, at most ǫ/5q fraction of the sample sets are not typical.
Notice that a typical sample set will yield an average that is ξ0-close to σ. This is a much higher
accuracy than required by the Z , which has a tolerance of ξ. However, B needs this accuracy to perform the
randomization.
Claim 2 If U is a typical set, then the answer from B for this query is valid.
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Proof: Notice that ifU is typical, then the average x is ξ0-close to the true value σ. After the randomization,
it is (ξ0 + ξ/2)-close to σ. This is less than ξ.
We consider the distribution of the answer produced by B for a particular query (g, ξ). We denote this
distribution by DU , where U is the sample set used by B.
Claim 3 If both U0 and U1 are typical sets, then the statistical distance between DU0 and DU1 is at most
ǫ/5q.
Proof: We use x0 and x1 to denote the averages obtained from U0 and U1, respectively. If both U0 and U1
are typical, we have |x0 − σ| ≤ ξ0 and |x1 − σ| ≤ ξ0. Thus we have |x0 − x1| ≤ 2ξ0. Notice that DU0 is
a uniform distribution over the interval of length ξ centered at x0, and DU1 a uniform distribution of same
length centered at x1. The claim follows from Lemma 4.
Notice the history set H consists of q sample sets. We say a history set H is typical, if all its sample sets
are typical. Then at most ǫ/5 fraction of the history sets are not typical. We denote the distribution of all
answers produced by B using history set H by TH .
Claim 4 If both H0 and H1 are typical, then the statistical distance between TH0 and TH1 is at most ǫ/5.
Proof: This directly follow the sub-additivity of statistical distance (see Appendix C).
Now we fix an arbitrary typical set H˜ and denote its corresponding distribution of the answers by T˜ .
Then we know the distribution from any typical set is at most ǫ/5 away from T˜ .
The only information Z receives from B is represented by the distribution of the answers produced by B,
which is in turn determined by the history set B uses. Thus, the distribution of the pair (m′, s′) is completely
determined by the history set H , and we denote this distribution by OH . We know that if H is typical, then
Pr(m,s)∈OH [vervk(m, s) = 1] ≥ ǫ. We fix the distribution O˜ that corresponds to the history set H˜ . Then we
have
Pr
(m,s)∈O˜
[vervk(m, s) = 1] ≥ ǫ. (4)
Furthermore, we know that for any typical history set H , its corresponding distribution of OH is ǫ/5-close
to O˜.
Consider a new experiment (a new execution of the breaker B) that is identical to the original one, except
when Z outputs a pair (m′, s′), it does so according to the fixed distribution O˜.
Claim 5 Let Mˆ be the maximum size of the sample sets in H˜ . Then the probability of the new experiment is
at least ǫ− Mˆ · q/2n.
Proof: Notice that the output ofZ is independent from the history set H . Moreover, the history set contains
at most Mˆ · q messages. So the probability that a particular m is in H is at most Mˆ · q/2n. This fact, along
with (4), proves the claim.
Now putting things together, with probability at most ǫ/5, the history set H is not typical; if H is typical,
the difference between the probabilities of the two experiments is at most ǫ/5; the probability of success of
the new experiment is at least ǫ− Mˆ · q/2n. Therefore the probability of success of the original experiment
is at least (for n large enough) ǫ− Mˆ · q/2n − ǫ/5− ǫ/5 > ǫ/2.
This finishes the proof.
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5 SQ sampling and SQ learning
We now point out relationships between our SQ sampling model and the SQ learning model of Kearns [22].
We begin with definitions of SQ learning. (In these definitions, we assume learning is with respect to the
uniform distribution over examples.)
Definition 5 (Statistical Query Learning Oracle) A statistical query learning oracle (SQL-oracle) for a
predicate f is denoted by SQLf . On an input (g, ξ), where g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1} 7→ {−1,+1} is the query
function and ξ ∈ [0, 1] is the tolerance, the oracle returns a real number y such that |y−Ex∈{0,1}n [g(x, f(x))]| ≤
ξ.
Definition 6 (Strong SQ-Learnability) A predicate class family C is Strong SQ-learnable if there exists a
randomized oracle machine Z , such that for every n > 0, every f ∈ Cn and for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0, Z with
access to any SQL-oracle SQLf outputs a hypothesis fˆ such that Prx∈{0,1}n [fˆ(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1 − ǫ with
probability at least 1 − δ, and furthermore, both the running time of Z and the inverse of the tolerance of
each query made by it are bounded by a polynomial in n, 1/ǫ and 1/δ. Here ǫ is called the accuracy and δ
the confidence.
Definition 7 (Weak SQ-Learnability) A predicate class family C is weak SQ-learnable if there exists a
randomized oracle machines Z and a polynomial p(·), such that for every n and for every f ∈ Cn, Z with
access to any SQL-oracle SQLf , outputs a hypothesis fˆ such that Prx∈{0,1}n [fˆ(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2+1/p(n),
and furthermore, both the running time of Z and the inverse of the tolerance of each query made by Z are
bounded by a polynomial in n.
The first observation to make is that a predicate class can be strongly SQ-learnable and yet not even
weakly SQ-samplable. In particular, any class with a sufficiently low density of positive examples can be
trivially learned by producing the “all zero” hypothesis. (Formally, if we wish be correct even for values
of ǫ that are exponentially small, it suffices to have the density less than 1/2n/2 so that if necessary we can
use the SQL oracle to identify all positive examples.) In the other direction, a class can be strongly SQ-
samplable and yet not even weakly SQ-learnable. Indeed, the family of negative parity functions taken over
the domain {0, 1}n is trivially SQ-samplable (because f(0n) = 1 for any such f ), but such functions are
not even weakly SQ-learnable [22]. It is interesting to compare this to Theorem 2, since the predicate class
families in these two theorems are very similar (one can think of the difference either as removing 0n from
the domain, or simply as changing the values of the functions at this one point), yet they have completely
different characterization in terms of SQ-samplability.
However, we show there is a relationship between these notions when the set of positive examples is
sufficiently dense.
5.1 SQ-learnability sometimes implies SQ-samplability
We prove that under certain circumstances, SQ-learnability implies SQ-samplability.
Definition 8 (Density of Predicates) The density of a predicate f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}, denoted by ρ(f), is
the fraction of its inputs that are positive. In other words, ρ(f) = Prx∈{0,1}n [f(x) = 1].
Definition 9 (Dense Predicates) A predicate class family C is dense if there exists a polynomial p(·) such
that for every n and for every f ∈ Cn, ρ(f) ≥ 1/p(n).
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Theorem 4 If a dense predicate class family is strong SQ-learnable, then it is also strong SQ-samplable
with the auxiliary input ρ.
Proof: Let Z be the algorithm that strongly SQ-learns dense predicate family C. We construct a new
algorithm A that strong SQ-samples C using the density ρ of the predicate f as auxiliary input. A runs a
copy of Z , whose accuracy and confidence are set to be ǫ = ρ · ǫ′/4 ln( 4ǫ′ ) and δ = ǫ′/4, and simulates the
SQL-oracle used by Z . We shall prove that A produces a positive input with probability at least 1− ǫ′.
We now describe the behavior of A. A works in two phases. In this first phase, it simulates the SQL-
oracle SQLf . When Z submits a query (g, ξ) to A, A does the following.
1. Set M = 9 ln(2q/δ)2ξ2 , draw M independent samples x1, x2, ..., xM from {0, 1}n , and compute
s =
1
M
M∑
i=1
g(xi, 0).
2. Construct two query functions g0(x) = g(x, 0) and g1(x) = g(x, 1). Submit queries (g0, ξ/3) and
(g1, ξ/3) to the SQS-oracle SQSf and receive y0 and y1 as answers.
3. Compute y = s+ (y1 − y0) · ρ and send y to Z as the answer to the query (g, ξ).
The algorithm A enters the second phase when Z produces a hypothesis fˆ . Then A repeats the following
procedure. It draws a random x ∈ {0, 1}n, and check if fˆ(x) = 1. If so it stops and output x; otherwise
it continues. The procedure is repeated ln
(
1
δ
)
/ρ times and if A still hasn’t stopped, it produces a random
x ∈ {0, 1}n and outputs it.
It is clear that A runs in polynomial time. Now, we prove that A produces a positive sample with
probability at least 1− ǫ′.
First, we prove that with probability at least 1 − δ, all answers provided by A are valid in the first
phase. Consider an average s as an approximation of Ex∈{0,1}n [g(x, 0)]. We say s is “bad”, if |s −
Ex∈{0,1}n [g(x, 0)]| > ξ/3. Then a simple application of the Hoeffding Bound (see Appendix B) proves
that the probability that s is bad is at most δ/q.
Next, notice that
g(x, f(x)) = g(x, 0) + [g(x, 1) − g(x, 0)] · f(x).
Therefore we have
Ex∈{0,1}n [g(x, f(x))] = Ex∈{0,1}n [g(x, 0)] +
Ex∈{0,1}n [(g(x, 1) − g(x, 0)) · f(x)]
= Ex∈{0,1}n [g(x, 0)] +(
Ex∈Sf [g(x, 1)] −Ex∈Sf [g(x, 0)]
) · ρ
Therefore, if s is not bad, then the y computed by A is a valid reply to query (g, ξ). Since Z makes a
total of q queries, with probability at least 1− δ, all the replies by A are valid and Z should perform well.
Next, consider the second phase of A. With probability at least 1− δ, Z should produce a hypothesis fˆ
that agrees with f with probability at least 1− ǫ. Let us assume th Z does produce such a fˆ . Now since a ρ
fraction of the inputs are positive, the probability that A doesn’t draw a positive input in ln
(
1
δ
)
/ρ rounds is
at most δ. The probability that fˆ makes a mistake in any of the rounds is at most ln
(
1
δ
) · ǫ/ρ. If fˆ doesn’t
make any mistakes and at least one positive input is drawn, then A will correctly output it.
Putting everything together, we know that with probability at least 1− 3δ− ln (1δ ) · ǫ/ρ = 1− ǫ′, A will
output a positive input.
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We remark that it appears necessary for the SQ-sampling algorithm to have the density ρ as an auxiliary
input. One difference between SQ-sampling and the SQ-learning is the resolution. In the reply of an SQS-
oracle, the underline distribution is uniform over the “hidden set” Sf ; for an SQL-oracle, the distirbution is
uniform over the entire set {0, 1}n. Therefore, a sampling algorithm needs to know the size of Sf in order
to perform the simulation (more precisely, in step 3 of the first phase).
It is interesting to compare this result to Theorem 3, which shows a predicate class family that is perfectly
SQ-learnable, but not even weakly SQ-samplable. Nevertheless, there is no contradiction since the predicate
class family in Theorem 3 is not dense.
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A Shor’s Algorithm and Simon’s Algorithm
We briefly summarize Shor’s algorithm for factoring and Simon’s algorithm for the hidden XOR-secret
problem.
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A.1 Shor’s Algorithm for Factoring
Standard number theory reduces factoring N to finding the order of a random element a modulo N , i.e.,
r > 0 such that ar ≡ 1 (mod N) but as 6≡ 1 (mod N) for any 0 < s < r. Suppose 2n−1 < N ≤ 2n.
Shor’s algorithm uses 2n qubits, separated into two n-qubit registers. Initially the state is initialized to
|φ0〉 = | 0n〉| 0n〉. By applying the Fourier transformation followed by modular exponentiation, this state
is converted to |φ1〉 = 12n/2
∑
x |x〉| ax mod N〉. Then one measures the second register and discard it,
leading to a state |φ2〉 =
∑
t | t · r+ c〉 for some random c ∈ [r], where t ranges from 0 to ⌊(2n − 1− c)/r⌋
(we ignore the scalar factor). Finally, one applies the inverse Fourier transform to the first register followed
by a measurement. The distribution of the measurement result is approximately uniform over {[t · 2n/r] :
0 ≤ t ≤ ⌊(2n − 1− c)/r⌋}. One can then solve r from one instance of [t · 2n/r] using continued fraction.
A.2 Simon’s Problem and Algorithm
A function f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}n is given as an oracle, with the promise that there exists an s ∈ {0, 1}n
(known as the “hidden secret”) such that f(x) = f(y) iff x ⊕ y = s. Notice that if s = 0n, then f is a
permutation, and otherwise f is a 2-to-1 function. The problem is to tell if s = 0n.
Simon’s algorithm works as follows. One starts with 2n qubits, separated into two n-qubit regis-
ters. Originally one initializes the state to |φ0〉 = | 0n〉| 0n〉. Next, one applies the Hadamard operator
to the first register and then the oracle operator |x〉| y〉 7→ |x〉| f(x) ⊕ y〉. The state becomes |φ1〉 =
1
2n/2
∑
x |x〉| f(x)〉. Next, the second register is measured and discarded. If s = 0n, then the measurement
result is |φ2〉 = |x〉 for a random x ∈ {0, 1}n. If s 6= 0n, then the measurement is |φ′2〉 = 1√2(|x〉+|x⊕s〉)
for a random x. Next, a Hadamard operator is applied to the first register. In the case s = 0n, the result is
|φ3〉 = | y〉 for a random y; in the case s 6= 0n, the result is |φ′3〉 = | y〉 for a random y such that y · s = 0.
Finally one measures the first register and obtains y. Repeating the experiment O(n) times, one can solve
for s by using Gaussian elimination and distinguish the case s = 0n from the case s 6= 0n.
B The Hoeffding Bound
We state the Hoeffding Bound, a classical result in estimating tail probabilities.
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding Bound [19]) Let k = (p − ǫ)n, where ǫ is a real number between 0 and 1/2, and p
is a real number between 0 and 1. We have
k∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)m−j ≤ e−2nǫ2 (5)
C Statistical Distance
We define the statistical distance and state some of its properties. The definitions and the results are standard.
A good reference to the statistical distance is Vadhan’s thesis [29].
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Definition 10 (Statistical Distance) The statistical distance between two probability distributions A and B,
denoted as SD(A,B), is defined to be
SD(A,B) =
1
2
∑
x
|A(x) −B(x)| (6)
where the summation is taken over the support of A and B. If SD(A,B) ≤ ǫ, we say A is ǫ-close to B.
This definition can be easily extended to the continuous case with the summation being replaced by
integral and the distributions replaced by density functions.
Lemma 2 Let T (x) be a probabilistic event with x as input. Let A and B be two distributions. We have∣∣∣∣ Prx∈A[T (x)]− Prx∈B[T (x)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ SD(A,B) (7)
Lemma 3 (Sub-additivity) Let A1, A2, B1, B2 be distributions, then we have
SD(A1B1, A2B2) ≤ SD(A1, A2) + SD(B1, B2) (8)
where AB denotes the tensor product of the distributions A and B, i.e., AB(a, b) = A(a) ·B(b).
Lemma 4 Let D1 be a uniform distribution over an interval [a, a+ l] and D2 a uniform distributions over
[b, b+ l]. Then SD(D1,D2) is at most |a− b|/l.
Proof: Notice that both D1 and D2 are uniform distributions of same length, and thus their density func-
tions have value 1/l over their supports and 0 elsewhere. Consider the absolute difference between the two
density functions, |D1(x)−D2(x)|. The size of its support is at most 2|a−b|. Thus SD(D1,D2) ≤ |a−b|/l.
D Proofs
Lemma 5 Let Xˆn,p be the domain defined in (1) and Ln,p be the class of normalized booleanized linear
functions over Xˆn,p. For any query function g : Xˆn,p 7→ {0, 1}, there are at most p2n/3+2 predicates in Ln,p
that are not 1/pn/3-independent from g.
For the proof we will need:
Lemma 6 ([31]) Let Ω = {fi} be a set of function of range {−1,+1} and d be its cardinality. If 〈fi, fj〉 =
λ for all i 6= j, then the set {f˜i} forms an orthonormal basis for the linear space spanned by Ω, where
f˜i(x) =
1√
1− λfi(x)−
1
d
·
(
1√
1− λ −
1√
1 + (d− 1)λ
)
·
d∑
j=1
fj(x) (9)
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Proof of Lemma 5: We first slightly modify the class Ln,p so that its range becomes {−1,+1}. We define
L˜a(x) = 2 · La(x) − 1. It is not hard to see that each of the pn−1 normalized booleanized linear functions
maps a 1/p fraction of the elements in Xˆn,p to +1, and a straightforward but tedious analysis (see [31] for
a detailed account) shows that any two normalized booleanized linear functions agree at exactly (p2 − 2p+
2)pn−2 − p places in Xˆn,p. We define an inner product between functions over Xˆn,p as
〈f, g〉 = 1
pn − p
∑
x∈Xˆn,p
f(x)g(x), (10)
With this inner product, any query function has norm 1, and any pair of distinct functions L˜a and L˜b have
the same inner product. This will allow us to “extract” an orthonormal basis from the class Ln,p using
Lemma 6.
Now we fix a query function g and relate predicates that are not ξ-independent from g to the Fourier
coefficients of g. Consider a booleanized linear function La, and we denote its positive set by S. We have
that |S| = pn−1 − 1. Suppose g maps a elements in Xˆn,p to +1, and b elements in S to +1. Then if La is
not ξ-independent from g, we have∣∣∣∣2a− pn + ppn − p − 2b− pn−1 + 1pn−1 − 1
∣∣∣∣ > ξ, (11)
or |a− bp| > pn−p2 ξ. We write b = a/p+ δ, and we have |δ| ≥ p
n−1−1
2 ξ.
Next we compute the inner product of g and L˜a. Straightforward computation shows that
〈g, L˜a〉 = 2 ·
(
2b− a+ (p− 1)(pn−1 − 1)
pn − p
)
− 1
=
(
1− 2a
pn − p
)(
1− 2
p
)
+
4δ
pn − p
On the other hand, the inner product of g with an average over booleanized linear functions is
1
pn−1
∑
b[0]=1
〈g, L˜b〉 = 1
pn−1(pn − p)
∑
b[0]=1
∑
x∈Xˆn,p
g(x)f˜b(x)
=
1
pn−1(pn − p)
∑
x∈Xˆn,p
g(x)
∑
b[0]=1
f˜b(x)
=
(
1− 2a
pn − p
)(
1− 2
p
)
Now we apply Lemma 6, setting d = pn−1 and λ = (p
2−4p+4)pn−2−p
pn−p . We will obtain an orthonormal
basis, which we denote by {Lˆb}.
Putting things together, we can compute that Fourier coefficient of g over the component Lˆa.
〈g, Lˆa〉 = 1√
1− λ〈g, L˜a〉 −(
1√
1− λ −
1√
1 + (d− 1)λ
)
· 1
d
∑
b[0]=1
〈g, L˜b〉
16
=
1√
1− λ ·
[(
1− 2
p
)
·
(
1− 2a
pn − p
)
+
4δ
pn − p
]
−(
1√
1− λ −
1√
1 + (d− 1)λ
)
·
(
1− 2
p
)
·
(
1− 2a
pn − p
)
=
1√
1 + (d− 1)λ
(
1− 2
p
)
·
(
1− 2a
pn − p
)
+
1√
1− λ ·
4δ
pn − p
=
1
p(n−1)/2
(
1− 2a
pn − p
)
+
2δ√
p(pn−1 − 1) ·
√
1− 1/pn−1
1− 4/p
≥ 2δ√
p(pn−1 − 1) −
1
p(n−1)/2
Now we substitute in ξ = 1/pn/3, and we have
|〈g, Lˆa〉| ≥ ξ√
p
− 1
p(n−1)/2
≥ 1
pn/3+1
(12)
Thus g can have at most p2n/3+2 such Fourier coefficients, and so there can be at most p2n/3+2 predicates
that are not 1/pn/3-independent from g.
Lemma 7 Let Xn = {0, 1}n\{0n} and Cn be the class of negative parity functions over Xn. For any query
function g : {0, 1}n 7→ {−1,+1}, there are at most 2n/2+2 predicates in Cn that are not 2−n/4-independent
from g.
Proof: We fix a negative parity function f . Let a denote the number of x ∈ {0, 1}n such that g(x) = 1, and
let b denote the number of x ∈ Sf such that g(x) = 1. Notice that since all parity functions are balanced,
we have |Sf | = 2n−1 − 1 (since f(0n) = 1 but 0n 6∈ Sf ). Then if f is not ξ-independent from g, we have∣∣∣∣2b− 2n−1 + 12n−1 − 1 − 2a− 2n2n
∣∣∣∣ > ξ (13)
or ∣∣∣∣ a− 2b2n−1 − 1
∣∣∣∣ > ξ − a2n−1(2n−1 − 1) > ξ − 12n−1 − 1 (14)
Next we perform Fourier analysis. We first define an inner product of real functions over {0, 1}n:
〈f, g〉 = 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x)g(x). (15)
We define a set of “modified parity functions” as ⊕˜s(x) = (−1)s·x, which map elements in {0, 1}n to
{−1,+1}. It is clear that the set of all parity functions {⊕˜s(x)}s form an orthonormal basis, and ⊕˜s(x) =
1 − 2¬ ⊕s (x). If a parity function ¬ ⊕s (x) is not ξ-independent from g, then (13) holds (by setting
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f = ¬⊕s). Let t = g(0n). Within the subset where ⊕˜s(x) = −1, which includes 0n and the positive set of
¬⊕s, g maps b+ t inputs to +1. Outside this subset, g maps a− b− t inputs to +1, and 2n−1 − a+ b+ t
input to −1. Thus, we can compute the Fourier coefficient of g on ⊕˜s.
〈⊕˜s, g〉 = 1− 2 · Pr
x∈{0,1}n
[⊕˜s(x) = g(x)]
= 1− 2 ·
(
a− b− t
2n
+
2n−1 − a+ b+ t
2n
)
=
2a− 4b− 4t
2n
Substituting in (14), we have
|〈⊕˜s, g〉| > ξ − 6/2n. (16)
However, notice that the query function g(x) has norm 1 and thus it can have at most 1/(ξ− 6/2n)2 Fourier
coefficients such that (16) holds. Now plugging in ξ = 2−n/4, we have 1/(ξ − 6/2n)2 ≤ 2n/2+2, and the
Lemma is proved.
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